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Hudgens v. NLRB and the Problem of State
Action in First Amendment Adjudication
Frederick F. Schauer*
In Hudgens v. NLRB,' the Supreme Court rejected the
claimed constitutional right of individuals and organizations to
use a privately owned shopping center, against the wishes of the
owner, as a forum for the exercise of first amendment rights.
The decision explicitly overruled Food Employees Union Local
590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,2 and affirmed a new focus for
free speech adjudication in the Supreme Court.
Logan Valley, decided in 1968, held that first amendment
protections for freedom of speech extended to activity on private
property that was open to the public3 and was the functional
equivalent of a central business district.4 Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner,5 decided only four years later, so limited the Logan
Valley holding6 that Hudgens is little more than a tombstone on
a rule four years dead. Since the progression from Logan
Valley to Hudgens took but eight years, it might seem appropri-
ate to relegate the entire area to a footnote in the history of
constitutional law. But the decision does more than mark the
extinction of a short-lived doctrine. More than any recent
decision, Hudgens, read in conjunction with its predecessors,
provides the framework for -an assessment of the state action
requirement in free speech cases.
This Article will suggest that Hudgens represents the Su-
preme Court's final rejection of the theory that the first amend-
ment requires the government to override the interests of private
property owners in order to facilitate public presentation of
diverse ideas and information. The Court's insistence that the
first amendment prohibits only government interference with
speech reaffirms the traditional concept of the free speech guara-
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College
of Law.
1. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
2. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
3. Id. at 319-20.
4. Id. at 318.
5. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
6. See text accompanying notes 29-34 infra.
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ntee and ties together several of the major speech cases of the
last five years.
I. BACKGROUND TO HUDGENS: FROM MARSH v.
ALABAMA TO LLOYD v. TANNER
The starting point for discussion is Marsh v. Alabama,7
since all of the later decisions turn on interpretation of Justice
Black's opinion in that case. The setting for Marsh was the
"company town" of Chickasaw, Alabama, a suburb of Mobile
owned entirely by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. The
town had "all the characteristics of any other American
town,"8-buildings, streets, stores, sewers, sidewalks, and the
like-but title to everything was in the corporation.9 Even the
town policeman, who had the same law enforcement powers as
municipal police in other Alabama communities, was paid by
the corporation.10  Enter Mrs. Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness who
distributed literature on the sidewalks of Chickasaw without
obtaining the required permit. Asked to leave, she persisted in
her activities and was arrested and convicted of criminal tres-
pass.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mrs. Marsh contended
that the actions of the corporation and the state abridged her
rights to freedom of speech and religion guaranteed by the
first and fourteenth amendments. Had the sidewalk in question
been municipally owned, the prohibition on distribution of reli-
gious literature without a permit would clearly have been uncon-
stitutional;" hence the question was whether the private owner-
ship of the town placed the actions of Gulf outside the realm of
7. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
8. Id. at 502.
9. "In short the town and its shopping district are accessible to
and freely used by the public in general and there is nothing to distin-
guish them from any other town and shopping center except the fact
that the title to the property belongs to a private corporation." Id. at
503.
10. Id. at 502.
11. At the time of the decision in Marsh, "liberty" under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment was deemed to embrace the
right of free speech. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). In Marsh, the court
relied specifically on such cases as Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); and Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), in which state prohibitions on distributions
of literature were overturned. The Court today retains its attitude of
strict scrutiny of any governmental regulation of public solicitation. See
Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976).
[Vol. 61:433
STATE ACTION
the fourteenth amendment and compelled a different result.12
In holding that first amendment principles applied to Chicka-
saw as to any other municipality, the Court reasoned that
since private landowners could not join together, establish a
municipal government, and restrict the speech of Mrs. Marsh, it
would be anomalous to sanction identical restrictions simply
because the town property had a single owner.1 3 Dismissing the
contention that Gulf's interests were analogous to those of a
homeowner in controlling the behavior of guests, the Court
stated: "Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion.
The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property
for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those
who use it.' 1 4 Although in a balancing of property rights against
first amendment rights the latter would have a "preferred posi-
tion,"15 the Court had to locate some state involvement in order
to bring the constitutional provisions into play.
Justice Black's opinion suggests that the Court relied on
two elements to establish the necessary tie with the state. The
first was delegation of state power. Noting that private com-
panies regulated by the state could not operate so as to burden
interstate commerce, the Court drew an analogy to private bur-
dens on speech.
We do not think it makes any significant constitutional differ-
ence as to the relationship between the rights of the owner
and those of the public that here the State, instead of per-
mitting the corporation to operate a highway, permitted it to
use its property as a town, operate a 'business block' in the
town and a street and sidewalk on that business block.'6
Put differently, the Court identified the requisite state action
as the state's permitting a corporation to govern a community
of citizens so as to restrict fundamental liberties.' 7
The Court implicitly suggested a second source of state
involvement by pointing out the state's crucial role in the
alleged deprivation of rights: the private trespass action against
12. The restrictions of the fourteenth amendment apply only to
states. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313,318 (1879).
13. 326 U.S. at 505.
14. Id. at 506. That the property had not been "dedicated" to the
public as a matter of state property law was not deemed controlling.
Id. at 505 n.2.
15. Id. at 509.
16. Id. at 507.
17. Id. at 509.
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Mrs. Marsh was enforced through the state criminal trespass stat-
ute.'8 It is unclear from the opinion, however, whether the four-
teenth amendment came into play only because of the state tres-
pass action or whether Chickasaw's "public function" status was
sufficient basis for the finding that Gulf's actions abridged Mrs.
Marsh's constitutional rights. 19
Under either theory, the Court's application of the four-
teenth amendment directly to a private entity appeared to signal
a major expansion of the state action doctrine, 20 but for some
time the effect of Marsh was minimal. Lower courts were
generally disinclined to extend its rationale beyond the facts of
the case.21 The advent of the shopping center, however, gave
the Marsh holding new significance. Because a shopping mall
serves many of the functions of a central business district, lower
18. The managers appointed by the corporation cannot curtail
the liberty of the press and religion of -these people consistently
with the purposes of the Constitutional guarantees, and a state
statute, as the one here involved, which enforces such action by
criminally punishing those who attempt to distribute literature
clearly violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution.
Id. at 508. Whether state enforcement of the discriminatory choices of
private parties is alone a sufficient source of state action in first amend-
ment cases is questionable. See notes 46-72 infra and accompanying
text.
19. See notes 53-55 infra and accompanying text.
20. Before Marsh, the most expansive decision on state action was
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), one of the "white primary" cases.
There the Court, relying on the fifteenth amendment, held that where
Texas statutes made the outcome of a party-conducted primary the de-
terminate of the nominees in the general election, the racially exclusive
membership policies of the Texas Democratic Party were state ac-
tion. At the time of the decision in Marsh, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948), and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715(1961), still lay ahead.
21. See, e.g., People v. Goduto, 21 Ill. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385, cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961) (parking lot); Watchtower Bible & Tract
Soc'y, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433, cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 886 (1948) (no right to distribute religious literature in
hallway of apartments within privately owned urban residential com-
munity); Good v. Dow Chem. Co., 247 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App.), ap-
peal dismissed, 344 U.S. 805 (1952) (private park); Hall v. Virginia, 188
Va. 72, 49 S.E.2d 369, appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 875 (1948) (apartment
building); cf. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d
541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950) (fourteenth amendment does
not prohibit racial discrimination in privately owned urban residential
community). But see Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
(court relied, in part, on Marsh to allow NAACP picketing at New York
World's Fair); People v. Barisi, 193 Misc. 934, 86 N.Y.S.2d 277 (Magis.
Ct. 1948) (court relied on Marsh to allow labor picketing at Pennsylvania
Railroad Station).
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courts were asked to decide whether, without the acquiesence of
the owner, there was a right to picket, handbill, or speak, at
privately owned shopping centers.22
In 1968, the issue came before the Supreme Court in Food
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.2 3 The
case involved a shopping mall in Pennsylvania occupied by two
stores at the time of the incidents that gave rise to the case, but
planned, and thereafter developed, as a full-scale shopping cen-
ter. One of the original stores was Weiss Markets, an employer
of non-union workers, whose parcel pickup area and parking lot
were picketed by the local foodhandlers union. Weiss and
Logan Valley Plaza obtained an order enjoining the picketing as
a trespass. In an opinion written by Justice Marshall, the Court
vacated the injunction and upheld the right to picket on private
property. Citing cases that would permit such picketing on
municipal property,24 the Court looked to the nature of the area
where the picketing occurred, rather than to its ownership.2 5
The key to the Court's decision was its conclusion that
"[t]he shopping center here is clearly the functional equivalent
of the business district of Chickasaw involved in Marsh.' 26 The
reasoning in the Logan Valley majority opinion tracked that of
the earlier case.
[T]he State may not delegate the power, through the use of
its trespass laws, wholly to exclude those members of the pub-
lic wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on the
22. See generally Comment, The Unions, Free Speech, and the
Shopping Center, 37 So. CAL. L. Rv. 573 (1964); 49 VA. L. REv.
1571 (1963). Representative cases include Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp.
v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Union, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d
921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233, cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1964); State v. Williams,
37 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 65,708 (Bait. Crim. Ct. 1959) (noted at 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1216 (1960)); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Wonderland Shop-
ping Center, Inc., 370 Mich. 547, 112 N.W.2d 785 (1963); and Moreland
Corp. v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 444, 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114
N.W.2d 876 (1962).
23. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
24. Id. at 313. The court relied on Teamsters Local 795 v. Newel,
356 U.S. 341 (1958); Bakery Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769
(1942); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); and Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88 (1940).
25. "[S]treets, sidewalks, parks and other similar public places are
so historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights
that access to them for the purposes of exercising such rights cannot con-
stitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely." 326 U.S. at 315.
26. Id. at 318. Justice Black, the author of the opinion in Marsh,
dissented from this characterization, pointing out differences between
shopping centers and company towns, and emphasizing the constitutional
importance of the concept of private property. Id. at 327-32.
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premises in a manner and for a purpose generally consonant
with the use to which the property is actually put.27
As in Marsh, the Court did not indicate whether both delega-
tion of authority over property and enforcement through a
trespass action were necessary to a finding of state action, or
What weight each element had in the ultimate determination.
Instead, the Court assumed Marsh had settled the state action
issue and thus found the functional similarities in public use
of the premises dispositive.
Because the picketers were protesting employment prac-
tices of a store within the shopping center, their speech was re-
lated to the shopping center's business. The Court expressly re-
served the question whether the Logan Valley holding would also
extend to speech unrelated to the uses of the property.28 That
issue came before the Court in 1972 in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner.
29
Lloyd Center was a shopping center in Portland, Oregon, consist-
ing of sixty stores in an enclosed mall. Licensed armed security
guards, employed by Lloyd, enforced a general prohibition
against distribution of handbills on shopping center property.30
Anti-Vietnam war leafletters, who were forced to leave the mall
on threat of arrest for trespass, brought an action for declaratory
and injunctive relief to restrain the enforcement of Lloyd
Center's policy against handbilling. In an opinion by Justice
Powell, the Supreme Court upheld the prohibition on handbilling
as applied to the facts of the case. Relying in part on Justice
Black's dissent in Logan Valley,3 1 the Court distinguished Lloyd
from Logan Valley, stating that in the latter the picketing was
directly related to the purpose of the property and there was
no other reasonable way to convey the particular message to the
intended audience.32 Since neither factor was present in Lloyd,3 3
27. Id. at 319.
28. Id. at 320 n.9. Justice White, in dissent, contended that the
Court's reliance on analogies to Marsh would compel extending constitu-
tional protections to picketing on any issue, since, of course, the content
of the speech in Marsh was wholly unrelated to the location. Id. at 339.
29. 407 U.S. 551 (1972). See generally The Supreme Court, 1971
Term, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 122 (1972); Note, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner: The
Demise of Logan Valley and the Disguise of Marsh, 61 GEO. L.J. 1187
(1973).
30. The distribution of handbills or pamphlets is, of course, clearly
within the scope of the first amendment. Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
31. 391 U.S. 308, 327 (1968).
32. 407 U.S. at 562-63. The Court brushed aside the statement in
Logan Valley that the mall was "the functional equivalent of the busi-
ness district of Chickasaw, Alabama," as "unnecessary to the decision."
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the rights of nonowners to use the property were to be deter-
mined in accord with the property owner's wishes-the public
was invited to be on the premises for business purposes only, not
to use the center for any and all purposes.3 4
II. HUDGENS v. NLRB: THE END OF A SHORT ERA
In light of Lloyd, a re-evaluation of the Logan Valley
doctrine was inevitable, and Hudgens v. NLRB,35 decided in
Id. at 562. In dissent, Justice Marshall argued that Lloyd Center was
even more public than Logan Valley Plaza; it had more stores, a wider
range of services, more roads, and its own security officers. Id. at 575.
This dissent, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart, would
have applied the Logan Valley rationale to any speech in a public meet-
ing area such as a shopping center, regardless of the content of the
speech. Id. at 584. They found the distinction between Lloyd and Logan
Valley untenable because speech cannot be regulated on the basis of con-
tent. Id. at 583.
33. Id. at 564-67.
34. Id. at 565. On this point, Justice Powell relied on Justice
White's dissent in Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 338. The repeated reliance
in the Lloyd opinion on the dissenting opinions in Logan Valley clearly
signalled the Court's dissatisfaction with Logan Valley and thus presaged
its outright rejection in Hudgens.
In order to underscore the significance of the property rights in-
volved, Justice Powell noted the constitutional basis of the concept of
private property, relying both on the due process and "taking" clauses
of the fifth amendment. If a taking without just compensation were in-
volved, however, legislation allowing public use of private property
for speech purposes would be as suspect, if not more so, as a constitu-
tional right to use property for the same purposes. Taken to its logical
conclusion, then, the civil rights acts, which similarly limit the allowable
uses of private property and mandate the admission of otherwise un-
wanted persons, see, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715 (1961), would require a grant of compensation to the property owner,
clearly a position the Court did not intend to take.
On the same day that the Court decided Lloyd, however, it also
handed down its decision in Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S.
539 (1972). Central Hardware involved labor picketing in the parking
lot of a store that was free standing, that is, not part of any shopping
center or group of buildings. Again reaffirming that the Constitution
does not restrict private action, the Court found the mere fact that
the lot was "open to the public" did not create a constitutional right
to engage in speech-related activity. Since no arguably central area was
present here, as in Logan Valley, the Court dismissed the constitutional
contentions and remanded for consideration solely in light of labor law
principles. This remand indicates that Justice Powell's dicta in Lloyd
about "just compensation" was not intended to be taken at face value,
since such a theory would bear heavily on the NLRB's power to declare
the prohibition on picketing an unfair labor practice.
It is interesting to note that at least two state courts interpreted
Lloyd's emphasis on property rights as precluding the states from giving
greater rights to speak on private property than those given by the Su-
preme Court. Thus, in Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460,
1977]
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1976, provided the opportunity. Hudgens was the owner of the
North DeKalb Shopping Center, an enclosed mall of sixty retail
stores in suburban Atlanta. One of the sixty stores was leased
and occupied by the Butler Shoe Company, which also owned a
warehouse in another part of town. As a result of a labor
dispute, the warehouse employees struck Butler and picketed all
the Butler retail stores, including the one in the North DeKalb
Shopping Center. The picketing took place within the enclosed
mall, and the manager of the shopping center threatened the
picketers with arrest if they did not leave. The union thereupon
filed an unfair labor practice charge against Hudgens which the
NLRB upheld, basing its decision on the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Logan Valley.86 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Board's
decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether access to private property for the purpose of labor
picketing was a matter of constitutional law, federal labor law,
both, or neither.
After reviewing Marsh, Logan Valley, and Lloyd, the ma-
jority, in a remarkable piece of jurisprudential gymnastics, held
that despite the painstaking efforts in Lloyd to distinguish Lo-
gan Valley on its facts, the reasoning in the two cases was so
inherently incompatible that Lloyd could only be read as over-
ruling the earlier case.8 7 The essence of the majority opinion in
Hudgens was that the protection Logan Valley gave "related"
113 Cal. Rptr. 468, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974), the California su-
preme court held that to allow unrelated speech (collecting signatures
on an anti-pollution initiative petition) in a shopping center, even if
based on state law, would unconstitutionally abridge the property rights
of the shopping center owner as established in Lloyd. A similar result
was reached in regard to the activities of the International Society of
Krishna Consciousness in Lenrich Assocs. v. Heyda, 264 Ore. 122, 504
P.2d 112 (1972) (noted at 86 HARv. L. REv. 1592 (1973)).
35. 424 U.S. 507 (1976), vacating and remanding 501 F.2d 161 (5th
Cir. 1974).
36. The Board held that refusal to allow the picketing contravened
the holding in Logan Valley and constituted an unfair labor practice un-
der section 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158
(a) (1) (1970). Hudgens v. Local 315, Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store
Union, 192 N.L.R.B. 671 (1971), and 205 N.L.R.B. 628 (1973).
37. But the fact is that the reasoning of -the Court's opinion in
Lloyd cannot be squared with the reasoning of the Court's opin-
ion in Logan Valley.
Our institutional duty is to follow until changed the law as it
now is, not as some members of the Court might wish it to be.
And in the performance of that duty we make clear now, if it
was not clear before, that the rationale of Logan Valley did not
survive the Court's opinion in the Lloyd case.
424 U.S. at 518.
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speech could not be reconciled with the lack of protection for
"unrelated" speech in Lloyd. "If a large self-contained shopping
center is the functional equivalent of a municipality, as Logan
Valley held, then the First and Fourteenth Amendments would
not permit control of speech within such a center to depend upon
the speech's content.
'38
While I will argue that the Court's result in Hudgens is
doctrinally correct, the Court's reasoning is nonetheless discon-
certing. Lloyd, because it distinguished Logan Valley,3 9 did
not specifically overrule that case and therefore did not discuss
its shortcomings. Because in Hudgens the Court claimed that
Lloyd had already overruled Logan Valley, it was again un-
necessary to explicate the weakness of that case. Thus, some-
where between Lloyd and Hudgens, Logan Valley disappears
without a trace. The Court explained only why Logan Valley
and Lloyd cannot co-exist; it failed to analyze why Lloyd
survives and Logan Valley is relegated to history.40 The untena-
38. Id. at 520. This problem had been recognized by Justice White
in his dissent in Logan Valley. 391 U.S. at 339.
39. 407 U.S. at 560-61.
40. The concurring and dissenting opinions in Hudgens reflect some
of the problems in the way the majority ended the rule of Logan
Valley. Justice Powell, in a short concurring opinion joined by the
Chief Justice, acknowledged the futility of his attempt in Lloyd to
distinguish that case from Logan Valley. "Upon more mature thought,
I have concluded that we would have been wiser in Lloyd Corp.
to have confronted this disharmony rather than draw distinctions based
upon rather attenuated factual differences." 424 U.S. at 524.
Justice White, on the other hand, in his concurring opinion, would
have avoided overruling Logan Valley by maintaining the distinction be-
tween related and unrelated speech and distinguishing Hudgens on the
ground that the picketing there did not relate to the store that was pick-
eted. Id. at 525. In light of his dissent in Logan Valley, this failure
to join in the majority opinion evidenced some displeasure with the ma-
jority's treatment of Logan Valley.
Finally, Justice Marshall, in a dissent joined by Justice Brennan, ar-
gued that the Court need not have reached the constitutional question.
The NLRB, he contended, did not base its decision on the constitutional
rule in Logan Valley, but rather incorporated the Logan Valley princi-
ples into its interpretation of the statute. Therefore, he would have af-
firmed the decision on statutory grounds, as a valid exercise of NLRB
power, without addressing the constitutional issue. In addition, however,
he objected both to the majority's reasoning and to the result on the
constitutional question. Basing his analysis on the theme of effective
channels for the communication of ideas, he argued that just as the com-
pany in Marsh owned the various forums for communication, so the
shopping center owner monopolized these same channels of communica-
tion and thus became obligated to make them available for the public
good. Id. at 525-34.
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ble distinction between related and unrelated speech that the
Court criticized 41 could just as easily have been avoided by af-
firming Logan Valley and reversing Lloyd, thereby affirming a
constitutional right, regardless of the content of the speech, to
picket or handbill at shopping centers and other places that are
"functionally equivalent" to the central business district in
Marsh.4
2
41. This emphasis on avoiding differing results depending upon the
content of the speech in question is one of the major themes of the
Burger Court's free speech decisions. See generally Karst, Equality as
a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cni. L. REv. 20 (1975).
Thus, in Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), the Court re-jected restrictions on drive-in theaters based on the content of the
films shown, where it was not alleged that the films were legally
obscene. And in Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972),
the Court invalidated an ordinance that prohibited picketing at public
high schools, but exempted labor picketing, finding this classification by
the content of the speech an equal protection violation. See also
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
The majority in Hudgens relied extensively on Erznoznik and
Mosley. Justice Marshall, dissenting, was not troubled by differences
based on the content of the speech when the basic question was the very
applicability of the first amendment, because the "degree to which the
private entity monopolizes the effective channels of communication may
depend upon what subject is involved." 424 U.S. at 541-42. His view
is based upon a primary concern with the availability of means for com-
municating various ideas and thus is less concerned with the existence
of state action as the starting point for first amendment analysis.
The equality principle was weakened somewhat in Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), where the Court, in an
opinion by Justice Stevens, upheld a Detroit zoning ordinance that
placed special zoning restrictions on "adult" bookstores and "adult" mo-
tion picture theaters. Although much of the majority opinion is devoted
to statements that the equality principle is not absolute, the decision
seems to turn on the Court's view that non-obscene sexually oriented
speech is less entitled to protection than other more "pure" forms of
speech.
42. The case was remanded, however, for consideration of whether,
in light of governing statutory principles of labor law, the refusal to al-
low the picketing was nonetheless an unfair labor practice. The question
remaining was whether there was a statutory right to picket on the
shopping center's property. Since Lloyd had referred to the constitu-
tional basis of the concept of private property, see note 34 supra, there re-
mained the possibility, albeit remote, that legislation requiring access to
private property without compensation to the owner would be deemed
unconstitutional. But the Court in Hudgens made clear that "statutory or
common law may in some situations extend protection or provide redress
against a private corporation or person who seeks to abridge the free
expression of others." 424 U.S. at 513. Therefore, the Court remanded the
matter for a new determination by the NLRB based solely on the appro-
priate balance between section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1970), which authorizes "concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining," and the rights of private property. This
[Vol. 61:433
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Tracing the treatment of the state action requirement
through the four cases is one key to the unelucidated premises of
Hudgens. Although the Marsh and Logan Valley discussions of
public function implicitly acknowledge that private persons
managing private property are not restricted by the first and
fourteenth amendments, in neither decision does the Court ex-
pressly mention the state action requirement. In both Lloyd
and Hudgens, the Court prefaces its analysis of first amendment
rights with the admonition that the Constitution protects only
against infringement by the government, 43 but does not discuss
the principle in any detail. A clear exposition of the theories by
which private property may be so entwined with the state as to
impose on the owner of the property the limitation of the first
amendment will demonstrate the consistency between Marsh and
Hudgens, and accordingly, the error of the reasoning of Logan
Valley.
III. STATE ACTION: THE UNDERLYING THEME
While the first amendment traditionally has been viewed as
a negative command against government interference with
speech,44 it has also been argued that it is a positive directive
requiring the government to facilitate the flow of ideas and
information. 45 The touchstone of the negative theory of the
first amendment is the state action requirement which, by estab-
lishing limits on the reach of constitutional prohibitions, leaves
private persons free to "discriminate" against the speech and
speech-related activities of others in ways that are forbidden to
the government. Underlying the Hudgens emphasis on state ac-
basic balancing test, weighing the statutory right to picket (or the right
of non-employee organizers to speak or distribute literature) against the
rights of private property, derives from NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
351 U.S. 105 (1956), and was reaffirmed by the Court in Central Hard-
ware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972). Thus, while in some circum-
stances the statutory right to picket or to organize might unconstitution-
ally infringe upon private property rights, the Court made clear that in
general the entire area is one of labor law, not constitutional law, and
therefore primary responsibility for the balancing of these interests must
rest with the NLRB. See generally Zimny, Access of Union Organizers to
"Private" Property, 25 LAB. L.J. 618 (1974); Comment, Expanding the
Right of Nonemployee Union Organizers to Solicit on Company Prop-
erty: Industrial Parks and Retail Stores, 21 BuFFAo L. Ruv. 451 (1972).
43. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972); Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976).
44. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); CBS v. Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1972).
45. See notes 96-103 infra and accompanying text.
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tion as the necessary first step of analysis in a first amendment
case are three important principles concerning free speech and
private property. First, state enforcement of private choice does
not constitute state action in a first amendment case. Second,
private property can be characterized as serving a "public func-
tion" and thus within the first and fourteenth amendments only
where the property owner has the power to control the flow of
information into a community. Third, private property owners
are not required to subordinate economic interests or personal
preferences to the goal of providing non-owners access to forums
for communication.
A. STATE ENFORCEIVIENT As STATE ACTION
Two years after Marsh, in Shelley v. Kraemer,46 the Su-
preme Court held that state court enforcement of a private
racially discriminatory choice, there a covenant restricting the
sale of neighborhood property to Caucasians, constituted state
action for fourteenth amendment purposes. Because this theory
of state action seemed to create the potential for encroachments
on individual choices regarding privacy, association, or property
use,47 Shelley has been seriously criticized, both by those who
felt the decision was simply wrong48 and by those who suggested
46. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
47. Perhaps anticipating this objection, the Court in Shelley noted
that
the restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as
violative of any rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Four-
teenth Amendment. So long as the purposes of those agree-
ments are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it
would appear clear that there has been no action by the State
and the provisions of the amendment have not been violated.
Id. at 13. "Voluntary adherence" is an empty concept, however. If in
Shelley the neighboring landowners had erected a wall around the prop-
erty so that the purchasers could not enter, and the purchasers had
brought suit to be allowed entrance to their own property, the Court
presumably would have held that recognition of the covenant as a de-
fense came within the Shelley rule. Cf. Clifton v. Puente, 218 S.W.2d
272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (court's denial of judgment for purchasers in
action for title and possession on basis of racially restrictive covenant
constitutes state action). But cf. Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park
Cemetery, 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953), affd by an equally divided
Court, 348 U.S. 880 (1954), vacated and cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 349 U.S. 70 (1955) (recognition by court of racially restrictive
covenant as defense in damage action is not unconstitutional state ac-
tion). Since the purpose of the covenant is to create legal rights and
duties, the inherent validity of the covenant is meaningless without legal
recognition of the "right."
48. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HAnv. L. REv. 1, 29-31 (1959); cf. Kurland, The Supreme Court,
[Vol. 61:433
STATE ACTION
more principled4 9 routes to the same result.50 The Court, for
its part, has been wary of extending Shelley beyond its facts.51
1963 Term-Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legis-
lative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARv. L. REv.
143, 148 (1964) (describing Shelley as "constitutional law's Finnegan's
Wake").
49. Cases like Shelley, of course, become unprincipled only in retro-
spect. The Court did not deliver a truly unprincipled opinion of the vari-
ety: "We like Shelley; we don't like Kraemer; therefore, Shelley wins."
Shelley became an unprincipled decision because its underlying principle
could not be, and in fact was not, extended to other situations, such as
wills, trusts, and sit-ins, seemingly encompassed by the principle stated
by the Court. See note 51 infra.
50. See, e.g., Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term--Foreword:
"State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81
HAV. L. REV. 69 (1967) (application of the equal protection clause to
racial discrimination implies an affirmative obligation on the part of the
state not necessarily present in other areas); Henkin, Shelley v. Krae-
mer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962) (empha-
sis should not be on state action aspects of Shelley but on balancing the
right to equality against countervailing rights of liberty and privacy);
Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. Rav. 208 (1957) (assume state action
in judicial enforcement but then balance rights of the parties); Lewis,
The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1083 (1960) (Shelley
should have been decided on the basis of the state's delegation to private
parties of the zoning power, an inherently governmental function); Pol-
lak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. Ray. 1 (1959) (the real distinguishing feature
of Shelley is that the state was not assisting A's right to discriminate,
but rather was assisting A to require that B, C, and D discriminate);
Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit
on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 855 (1966) (the
words "equal protection of the laws" imply an affirmative obligation on
the part of the state); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L.
REV. 3 (1961) (assume state action in judicial enforcement but then bal-
ance rights of various interested parties); Williams, The Twilight of State
Action, 41 TEXAs L. REv. 347 (1963) (similar).
The reasoning of the Shelley court did have a few defenders, e.g.,
Carl, Reflections on the "Sit-Ins", 46 CORNELL L.Q. 444 (1961); Ming,
Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive
Covenant Cases, 16 U. Cm. L. REv. 203 (1949).
51. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), in which the Court refused
to strike a racially restrictive provision in the will of Senator Bacon so
as to allow a park to be continued as a public park, seemed to foreclose
the possibility that Shelley would require review of such enforcement as
state action. But cf. Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968) (court substitution of individual for munic-
ipal trustees in order to carry out racial exclusion was unconstitutional
state action). See also Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 228,
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955). See generally Adams, Racial and
Religious Discrimination in Charitable Trusts: A Current Analysis of
Constitutional and Trust Law Solutions, 25 CLaV. ST. L. REV. 1 (1976);
Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of
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In Marsh, Justice Black noted that "a state statute ...
which enforces such action [of excluding the Jehovah's
Witnesses] by criminally punishing those who attempt to distrib-
ute literature clearly violates the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution."5 2 Criminal trespass laws are not per
se unconstitutional. Had Mrs. Marsh been excluded on the
ground that she drove recklessly through the central business
district, or was managing an illegal gambling establishment, and
the exclusion had been enforced by the state criminal trespass
laws, no constitutional issue would have been presented. Since
Mrs. Marsh was excluded solely at the behest of the private
owner, and no state official or agency was involved in the
decision, the issue was whether state action, in the fourteenth
amendment sense, arises when the state enforces a private choice
which, if made by the state, would violate the first amendment.
Thus, the opinion appeared to suggest a rule similar to that in
Shelley-that one source of state action was the use of a state
statute and state courts to prosecute trespassers such as Mrs.
Marsh.
Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979 (1957); Shanks, "State Action" and
the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 213 (1956).
Similarly, the Court's refusal to face the enforcement-as-state-action
issue in the sit-in cases reflects disenchantment with the possibilities
Shelley opened up. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Peterson
v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 267 (1963). See generally Carl, supra note 50; Haber, Notes on the
Limits of Shelley v. Kraemer, 18 RuTGERs L. REV. 811 (1964); Lewis, The
Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 101; Schwelb, The
Sit-In Demonstration: Criminal Trespass or Constitutional Right?, 36
N.Y.U.L. REV. 779 (1961).
The most recent attempt to revitalize the Shelley rationale has
been in the procedural due process area. As a result of recent cases
such as Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), and Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), holding unconstitutional various state
procedures for pre-judgment attachment and garnishment, it has been
suggested that Article 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, or similar
state statutes, are unconstitutional because they permit self-help re-
possession without notice or hearing to the debtor. This theory has,
for the most part, met with little acceptance by the courts. See,
e.g., Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974). See generally Burke & Reber,
State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on
the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 1003, 47 S. CAL. L. REV.
1 (1973); Dunham, Due Process and Commercial Law, 1972 Sup. CT. REV.
135; Spak, The Constitutionality of Repossession by Secured Creditors
Under Article 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 Hous. L. REv.
855 (1973); Yudof, Reflections on Private Repossession, Public Policy
and the Constitution, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 954 (1974).
52. 326 U.S. at 508.
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A few commentators read Marsh as lending itself to that
interpretation.5 3 Most, however, concluded that Marsh was
grounded on the principle that private entities exercising govern-
ment-like powers came within the purview of the fourteenth
amendment. 54 In Shelley itself, the Court made only oblique ref-
erence to Marsh in the state action discussion.55 The decision
in Logan Valley, however, with its mirror-image revival of the
Marsh rationale, once again raised the possibility that by analogy
to Shelley, state enforcement of a private choice restricting the
speech of others would require review of that choice under con-
stitutional standards."&
The issue of state enforcement did not arise in Hudgens
since the appellees had not been arrested or charged.57 The
53. See Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-
Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion of Economic Power, 100 U.
PA. L. REV. 933 (1952); 44 MicH. L. REV. 848 (1948) [hereinafter cited
as Comment].
54. See, e.g., Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 50, at 45; Lewis, su-
pra note 50, at 1116; Note, Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment
to Private Organizations, 61 HARv. L. REV. 344 (1948); Comment, supra
note 53.
55. Nor do we find merit in the suggestion that property owners
who are parties to these agreements are denied equal protection
of the laws if denied access to the courts to enforce the terms
of restrictive covenants and to assert property rights which the
state courts have held to be created by such agreements. The
Constitution confers upon no individual the right to demand ac-
tion by the state which results in the denial of equal protection
of the laws to other individuals. And it would appear beyond
question that the power of the State to create and enforce prop-
erty interests must be exercised within the boundaries defined
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946).
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
56. It has been suggested that whenever a state court is pre-
sented with a choice one resolution of which would serve to pre-
vent racial discrimination, the fourteenth amendment subjects to
review as state action the choice of the other resolution. If,
analogously, the individual's right to be free of unconstitutional
infringement of first amendment expression runs against any
state choice not to vindicate the free exercise of that expression,
then Logan Valley may bar a state court from aiding private
action that threatened to infringe free speech as effectively as
did the injunction issued by the state in this case.
The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HA V. L. Rsv. 63, 133 (1968). See
also Johnson & Westen, A Twentieth-Century Soapbox: The Right to
Purchase Radio and Television Time, 57 VA. L. REv. 574, 596-97 (1971);
Comment, Constitutional Law: Shopping Center Not Open to First
Amendment Activity Unrelated to Use, 57 MINN. L. REv. 603, 605 (1973).
57. In Hudgens, the picketers left the mall after being threatened
with arrest. No charges were actually brought. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507, 509 (1976). But see Johnson & Westen supra note 56, at 597
(arguing that result would have been the same in Logan Valley even
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Court's firm stand in favor of the rights of property owners to
determine to what extent and for what purposes their holdings
are open to the public58 would, however, be inconsistent
with application of a Shelley-type state action rule. The worth
to an individual of the right to make any choice about the
use of property or to take any action depends on the power
of the state to ensure the effectiveness of that action. Thus,
if enforcement of a private choice neither required nor en-
couraged by the state makes the substance of the choice re-
viewable as state action, the line between private action and
state action disappears entirely, and private decisionmaking is
circumscribed by the same constitutional limitations imposed on
public decisionmaking. 59
Even assuming that with regard to racial discrimination the
dangers of treating state enforcement as state action are out-
weighed by necessity, 60 matters concerning freedom of speech
bring different values into play. Private choices based on the
content of speech are not, unlike racially discriminatory
choices,6 ' viewed by society as inherently evil. Rather, individ-
if private guards had removed the picketers and they had subsequently
sued the owners of the shopping center).
58. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
59. Advocates of the Shelley rule and an expansive doctrine of state
action in race discrimination cases contend that the "private" decision-
making affected would be only that which had some impact on public
life. Thus, refusal to serve black patrons in a restaurant would be "state
action" subject to the fourteenth amendment-choice of dinner guests
would not be. See, Black, supra note 50, at 100-03; Henkin, supra note
50, at 487-96.
60. Although the fourteenth amendment does not expressly prohibit
private racial discrimination, it has been argued that the ultimate goal
of the amendment must be to eliminate all racial discrimination, whether
by the government or by private citizens. See Black, supra note 50. Prob-
ably for this reason, courts have consistently been more likely to find
state action, and thus violations of the fourteenth amendment, in cases
involving racial discrimination than in cases where race is not an issue.
The doctrine of state action developed primarily in the area of
racial discrimination .... The concepts developed in this area,
explicitly supported by constitutional and legislative mandates,
were necessarily broadly drawn in order to implement Congres-
sional intent in circumstances of positive and frequent state ob-
fuscation and delay. The potentially explosive impact of the ap-
plication of state action concepts designed to ferret out racially
discriminatory policies in areas unaffected by racial considera-
tions has led courts to define more precisely the applicability
of the state action doctrine.
Greco v. Orange Mem. Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873, 879 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975) (citations omitted).
61. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973). Rawls argues that because the desire
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ual decisions about speech-preferring some ideas and informa-
tion to others, placing one's property at the service of some
ideologies and not others-are central to the concept of a mar-
ketplace of ideas. Ideas fail or succeed according to their ability
to win support in free public debate.6 2 A private person
participates in that debate when he contributes the use of his
property to the proponents of certain ideas; that is an act of
advocacy as surely as if he were disseminating the ideas himself.
If private persons were held to the same rigid standards the
state must observe in limiting speech, an owner could impose
restrictions only as to the "time, place, and manner"63 of the ac-
tivity and could not discriminate according to the substance of
the ideas.64 Whether the owner's decisions in this respect were
reasonable would be determined by balancing the interests of the
would-be speaker against those of the property owner.6 5 Where
the property was open to the public, the speaker would prevail
unless his activity interfered with the use to which the property
was put.68 A court, not the owner, would determine whether
to discriminate is not a "right," it is entitled to no value in the ordering
of society. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 30-31 (1971).
62. Free speech has occupied an exalted position because of the
high service it has given our society. Its protection is essential
to the very existence of a democracy. The airing of ideas re-
leases pressures which otherwise might become destructive.
When ideas compete in the market for acceptance, full and free
discussion exposes the false and they gain few adherents. Full
and free discussion even of ideas we hate encourages the testing
of our own prejudices and preconceptions. Full and free discus-
sion keeps a society from becoming stagnant and unprepared for
the stresses and strains that work to tear all civilizations apart.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).
63. See, e.g., Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
64. See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
65. Such a balancing test is applied where a statute or ordinance
restricts the right of speech. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S.
36 (1961); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Whether the test is
an appropriate mode of first amendment analysis has been disputed, see
generally Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424
(1962), but for purposes of this Article, the merits of balancing per se
are not relevant. Marsh is often cited as a balancing case, see Edwards
v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 695-96 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969); Johnson & Weston, supra note 56, at 596-97. In Marsh the Court
applied the same balancing test to the corporation's acts as it would to
a municipality, for the Court had already determined that Gulf should
be treated like any other city government.
66. See Comment, supra note 56, at 608 n.26 (describing a series
of California cases in which such a test was applied to activity on private
property).
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there was such interference. In short, an owner subject to the
limits of the first amendment could not, on the basis of content
alone, deny the use of his property to proponents of ideas the
propagation of which he found personally repugnant or commer-
cially disadvantageous.
The first amendment, however, was not intended to force
such neutrality on private persons. Indeed, the ideals of free
public debate and a marketplace of ideas presume that there will
be partisanship and preference for some ideas over others. The
first amendment works only to prohibit the government from
suppressing speech because of its content.6 7 When a state court
enforces a property owner's decision to bar some speech-related
activity it does not determine that in the eyes of the state the
excluded ideas have less merit than those which the property
owner allows. 68 Rather, without directing or encouraging any
particular choice, 69 the court preserves the owner's ability to
make-and act on-his own decision about the merits of com-
peting ideas. Since the first amendment does not assure that
67. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Public
Utils. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
68. Judge Coffin of the First Circuit has suggested a definition of
"neutrality" which allows a principled distinction between the applica-
tion of the Shelley rule in racial cases and in speech cases. A state court
is neutral, he reasons, unless it must be made privy to a discriminatory
purpose in order to determine the validity of a claim. Lavoie v. Big-
wood, 457 F.2d 7, 11 (lst Cir. 1972). Thus, in Shelley, in order to rule
that the covenant had been breached, the pleadings had to assert the
race of the buyers. In contrast, in a case such as Hudgens, the land
owner's motive for bringing a trespass action is irrelevant and need never
be brought before the court. Judge Coffin acknowledged that "[w] hile
not exactly satisfactory, this approach at least recognizes conscious state
involvement without insisting upon an unattainable purity." Id. at 12.
69. In CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1972), the
Court held that FCC licensing was not sufficient to make the network
policy of refusing political advertising state action in violation of the first
amendment. The FCC did not foster the policy in question, but merely
failed to require networks to accept such ads. Similarly, in Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), the Court ruled that issuance of
a liquor license by the Pennsylvania Liquor Authority was not state en-
couragement that would render the private club's racially discriminatory
membership policies state action under the fourteenth amendment. The
only relief granted to the Moose Lodge plaintiffs was an injunction
against enforcement of a Liquor Control Board regulation which required
that "[e]very club licensee shall adhere to all of the provisions of its
Constitution and By-Laws." In enforcing the rule, the state agency
would require the club to choose members on the basis of race.
Thus the Court stated, "Shelley v. Kraemer ... makes it clear that the
application of state sanctions to enforce such a rule would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 179.
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everyone has a right to speak whenever or wherever he chooses, 70
or to force others to listen to his ideas71 or contribute use of
property to their support,7 2 the courts in upholding the private
right to select among sources of information and ideas do
no more than enforce the ground rules of public debate and
protect an element of first amendment freedom as important -as
the right to speak.
B. PUBLIC FUNcTIoN
All individual acts are done with the permission of the
state in the sense that the state permits that which it does not
prohibit.7 3 Corporations, since they are creatures of the state,
74
act with the state's positive encouragement as well. While a
doctrine that finds state action in all corporate decisions must
be rejected in order to preserve the distinction between public
and private action,75 there are activities which, when performed
by private entities, appear to involve a more specific state dele-
gation of power than do the normal activities of the private sec-
tor. There is a strand7 6 of state action analysis which recognizes
that the state's delegation of governmental functions to private
70. See Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966).
71. See Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949).
72. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). In
Lloyd, Justice Marshall noted in dissent that the shopping center had
allowed the American Legion, a group that presumably had a politi-
cal view opposed to the anti-war demonstrators who sought access,
to use the facilities. 407 U.S. at 579 n.3. It is surely reasonable
to characterize the decision of the shopping center owner to furnish a
forum for the American Legion and bar the anti-war leafletters as a form
of advocacy or expression, an act which ought to be protected by the
first amendment.
73. "But the state can be said to authorize all conduct that it does
not prohibit, and in this sense the state is 'involved' in all private con-
duct that it does not condemn." Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mul-
key: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REV.
39, 55. See also Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political"
and "Economic" Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 149 (1935).
74. See Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activities-
Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power,
100 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1952); Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government
by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 155 (1957).
75. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
76. In light of the various theories of state action put forth in the
cases, it is impossible to say that there is any one theory which predomi-
nates, or that there is some "standard" state action doctrine. The public
function doctrine discussed here, however, is rarely combined with any
of the other theories.
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parties may constitute state action even where the state is not
actively involved in the private party's challenged act. The
origin of the theory is commonly attributed to Marsh, where
Justice Black suggested that the necessary connection with the
state could be found in the similarities between the company
town of Chickasaw, Alabama, and any other conventionally
organized municipality and in the state's permitting a corpora-
tion "to govern a community of citizens. ' 77 Cases following
Marsh present the public function theory more clearly. Thus, in
Evans v. Newton,75 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas,
stated that certain activities, such as controlling public parks,
elections, and transit systems, may be so inherently governmen-
tal that even in private hands they are the activities of the state.79
Like other theories of state action, however, the "govern-
mental function" theory may prove too much, since there
are many private activities that might be characterized as
public or government-like.80 The task at first is to identify the
functions that can support a finding of state action."' Clearly,
any test based on the "importance" or "fundamental" nature of
an activity is incapable of application as well as analytically
unsound, since there is no basis in logic or in history to attribute
to the state all important or fundamental societal functions.
8 2 It
77. 326 U.S. at 509. The Court seems to be implicitly adopting a
view, most often associated with Jeremy Bentham, that property exists
solely because the government protects it, and without governmental
protection there is no property. J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION,
PRINCIPLES OF THE CiviL CODE 111-13 (7th Hildreth ed. 1891). By this the-
ory, use of property can be deemed governmental action, since the right
to use the property derives from permission. In contrast, if property ex-
ists by some right of natural law, the use of property is not a matter
of the state's grace, and the state is less involved in any particular use
of private property. See J. LOcKE, TREATISE ON CiL GOVEWINVENT ch. V,
at 18-34 (Sherman ed. 1937). See generally B. ACKERmAN, ECONOmiC
FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (1975).
78. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
79. Id. at 302.
80. Schools, corporations, labor unions, and trade associations are
examples. See Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and
"Governmental Action," 70 YALE L.J. 345 (1961).
81. The inquiry is similar to distinguishing between the government
and proprietary functions of the state in tort law. See Abernathy, Ex-
pansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
43 CORNELL L.Q. 375 (1958). For a tort law analysis of Marsh, Logan
Valley, Lloyd, and Hudgens, see Schwartz, A Landholder's Right to Pos-
session of Property Versus a Citizen's Right of Free Speech: Tort Law
as a Resource for Conflict Resolution, 45 U. CIn. L. REV. 1 (1976).
82. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974), a pro-
cedural due process case based on a termination of electric services with-
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would be absurd, for example, to label all activities of physi-
cians or attorneys state action because their services are im-
portant to their communities. 83 Similarly, while education is
of fundamental importance,8 4 the actions of private schools are
not necessarily state action.8 5 A privately owned utility, regula-
ted and licensed by the state as a monopoly, does not exercise
powers "traditionally associated with sovereignty. '8 6 Perhaps
the best rule would be to characterize as public functions those
powers which are inherently governmental. When a private
entity exercises powers that are traditionally performed only by
the state, it is reasonable to apply constitutional standards to that
entity's acts.8 7 Viewed in this light, the rule in Marsh survives
Hudgens. Operating an entire town can, without undue diffi-
culty, be described as an inherently governmental function; Gulf
wielded many of the powers of a sovereign over the lives of its
citizens. Imposing constitutional restrictions on the company's
conduct served the first amendment goal of protecting citizens
from potential abuses of governmental power.
It is easy to see how the Court got off the right track in
Logan Valley. Justice Marshall drew the analogy to Marsh on
the theory that since the shopping center was the functional
equivalent of the business block in Chickasaw, ownership of
out a notice or hearing, the petitioner argued that the "essential" nature
of the utility service provided by Metropolitan Edison made its activities
state action. Id. at 352. The Court declined to expand the doctrine into
"a broad principle that all businesses 'affected with a public interest' are
state actors in all their actions." Id. at 353. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
83. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345, 354 (1974).
84. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
85. The Court impliedly rejected this argument in Evans v. Newton,
382 U.S. 296, 300 (1966). Private schools are, however, within the scope
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), enacted under the authority of the thirteenth
amendment, and may not, if they seek their students from among the
general public, forbid admission to black students on racial grounds.
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
86. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974).
87. "[W]hen a state permits this kind of private activity it must
couple the permission with certain restrictions. If these are not supplied,
the Court will supply them under the fourteenth amendment." Lewis,
supra note 50, at 1097. In Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), for ex-
ample, the Court found that the all-white Jaybird primary was, with
the acquiescence of the state, operating to deny black citizens the right
to vote. Analogies chosen from Terry, however, must take account of
the fact that it was a decision based on the fifteenth amendment, which
may require greater affirmative duties from the states than does the
fourteenth. See Lewis, supra note 50, at 1093-96. But see Note, supra
note 54, at 344.
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roads, sewers, and surrounding areas was irrelevant.8 8 On the
contrary, Gulf's ownership of the roads and sewers was centrally
important, for its totality of ownership was clear evidence of its
totality of government-like power. As a consequence of that
power, Gulf could control the flow of information to Chickasaw's
citizens. The modern shopping center, although it may be a pub-
lic meeting place, does not fulfill an inherently or even tradition-
ally governmental role; its owners cannot be said to exercise
powers equivalent to those of the state.8 9 More important, since
the owner of the shopping center does not govern an entire com-
munity, he cannot, like Gulf, cut off citizen access to information.
The analogy between Logan Valley and Marsh fails precisely at
this point, because the Logan Valley property owner could not
limit the kinds of information and ideas that entered the com-
munity at large.90
Logan Valley would be correct only if one of the following
were true: (1) state action is unnecessary in first amendment
adjudication; (2) providing a central meeting place is an inher-
ently governmental function; (3) a shopping center owner is
able to deny customers the right to hear views of which he
disapproves. The first proposition is clearly untenable.91 The
88. 391 U.S. at 318-19.
89. This is the distinction between the company town end the resi-
dential private government. See generally Reichmann, Residential Pri-
vate Governments: An Institutional Survey, 43 U. Ci. L. Rsv. 253
(1976).
90. The migrant labor camps may prove to be the true test of the
continuing validity of the Marsh "company town" holding. See Illinois
Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 519 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1975); Pe-
terson v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973); Associacion
de Trabajadores Agricolas de Puerto Rico v. Green Giant Co., 376 F.
Supp. 357 (D. Del. 1974), aff'd, 518 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1975); Velez v.
Amenta, 370 F. Supp. 1250 (D. Conn. 1974); Franceschina v. Morgan, 346
F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Ind. 1972); Folgueres v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D.
Mich. 1971); Agricultural Labor Rel. Bd. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d
430, 546 P.2d 713, 128 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1976); United Farm Workers v.
Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 902, 537 P.2d 1237, 122 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1975);
State v. Fox, 82 Wash. 2d 289, 510 P.2d 230, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130
(1973). See generally Note, First Amendment and the Problem of Ac-
cess to Migrant Labor Camps After Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner, 61 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 560 (1976); Note, Access to Farms as Mandated by the
United States Constitution and By Action of the California Board of Ag-
ricultural Labor Relations, 8 Sw. U.L. REv. 165 (1976); Comment, Toward
a Constitutional Right of Access to Migrant Labor Camps, 29 RUTGERS L.
RaV. 972 (1976); Comment, The Bill of Rights, State Action, and Private
Migrant Labor Camps, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 214.
91. The Court's treatment of Marsh in the Hudgens opinion is some-
what curious on this point.
It is, of course, a commonplace that the constitutional guar-
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second, opening the door for any school, library, or parking
lot to be deemed a public function, is too broad.9 2 The third is
clearly against the common sense of our experiences. The
owner of a mall is unlikely to control community newspapers, or
radio and television stations, or the speakers in public parks and
streets. Only to the extent that a state acquiesces in a private
party's control over all forums for speech, as in Marsh, will the
owner's ability to control the speakers and the content of speech
on his property be subject to first amendment restrictions.
In so constricting the meaning of public function for speech
cases, Hudgens93 contradicts the contention that an owner who
opens property to the public for commercial purposes has volun-
tarily relinquished any claim to privacy or exclusivity of use.9 4 In
Lloyd, the Court clearly stated its view that the interests of
property owners need not be abrogated in order to serve the
interests of would-be communicants.
Nor does property lose its private character merely because
the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes.
Few would argue that a free-standing store, with abutting space
for customers, assumes significant public attributes merely be-
cause the public is invited to shop there. Nor is size alone the
controlling factor. The essentially private character of a store
and its privately owned abutting property does not change by
virtue of being large or clustered with other stores in a modern
shopping center....
antee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by
government, federal or state .... Thus, while statutory or com-
mon law may in some situations extend protection or provide
redress against a private corporation or person who seeks to
abridge the free expression of others, no such protection or
redress is provided by the Constitution itself.
This elementary proposition is little more than a truism. But
even truisms are not always unexceptionably true, and an excep-
tion to this one was recognized almost 30 years ago in the case
Marsh v. Alabama_...
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (citations omitted). If the
Court is hinting that there was no basis for a state action finding in
Marsh, it would also have to disavow other "public function" cases such
as Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (1953). It seems more likely, therefore, that Marsh was exceptional
as the rare case in which a private corporation was sufficiently like a
government to be subject to constitutional restrictions.
92. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 319-22 (1966) (Harlan, 3.,
dissenting).
93. It is more accurate to say that Lloyd and Hudgens taken to-
gether indicate the parameters of the property owner's control. Hudgens
merely declared that since Lloyd and Logan Valley were incompatible,
the latter case was overruled. See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying
text. In Lloyd, the Court more clearly indicates its views about private
property and free speech. See note 94 infra and accompanying text.
94. For an expression of that view, see Johnson & Weston, supra
note 56, at 610-11.
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[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of private
property owners, as well as the First Amendment rights of all
citizens, must be respected and protected. The Framers of the
Constitution certainly did not think these fundamental rights
of a free society are incompatible with each other. There may
be situations where accommodations between them, and the
drawing of lines to assure due protection of both, are not easy.
But on the facts presented in this case, the answer is clear.95
C. ACCESS TO CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION
The Hudgens Court's implicit rejection of a Shelley-type state
action rule9 6 and its severely limited definition of public func-
tion97 are significant in their relation to the recent first amend-
ment controversy over government-enforced access to channels
of communication. Proponents of the access theory, most notably
Professor Barron,98 argue that because the right to speak is an
empty formalism without the concomitant right to make one's
voice heard, the first amendment must be read as protecting the
right to use effective means of communication.9 9 The underlying
premise of the theory is that concentration of media control in a
few hands'00 prevents presentation of diverse viewpoints and in-
hibits the informed public debate that the first amendment is in-
tended to foster.101
95. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1972).
96. See notes 58-72 supra and accompanying text.
97. See notes 88-95 supra and accompanying text.
98. Barron, Access-The Only Choice for the Media?, 48 TEXAs L.
REV. 766 (1970); Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access
to the Media?, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1969); Barron, Access to the
Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1641 (1967).
Cf. Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of
the Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. REv. 1
(1973).
99. See, e.g., Johnson & Westen, supra note 56. For a thorough list-
ing of literature on the subject, see Lange, supra note 98, at 2 n.5, 5
n.21.
100. There has been much commentary about concentration in the
communications industry and about the effect of that concentration on
the flow of ideas and information. E.g., Daniel Right of Access to Mass
Media-Government Obligation to Enforce First Amendment?, 48 TEXAs
L. REV. 783 (1970); Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broad-
caster: Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768 (1972);
Ldevinger, Free Speech, Fairness and Fiduciary Duty in Broadcasting,
34 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 278 (1969); Robinson, The FCC and the First
Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regu-
lation, 52 MiNN. L. REV. 67 (1967); Media and the First Amendment in a
Free Society, 60 GEo. L.J. 867 (1972); Note, Conflict Within the First
Amendment: A Right of Access to Newspapers, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1200
(1973); Note, Free Speech and the Mass Media, 57 VA. L. REV. 636 (1971).
101. See Barron, Access to the Press, supra note 98.
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According to this affirmative view of the first amendment,
when a newspaper sells advertising space or a broadcast network
sells air time to some groups and not others, it infringes the first
amendment rights of those excluded. Advocates of access relied
heavily on Marsh and Logan Valley for theories of state action
that would translate the actions of private media-controlling
persons into governmental action subject to the restrictions of
the free speech guarantee. Thus, the public function doctrine
was used to argue that newspapers enjoying a monopoly position
in an area of vital public concern were engaged in state action
and thus were barred from making content -a criterion for rejec-
tion of advertising.10 2  Similarly, the FCC's role in licensing
and regulating broadcasting and judging disputes between
broadcasters and access seekers was analogized to the enforce-
ment role of state courts in Marsh and Logan Valley. 03 The
arguments had varied success in lower courts. 0 4
Twice before Hudgens however, the Supreme Court consid-
ered and rejected a right of access to print and broadcast media.
In CBS v. Democratic National Committee,0 5 the Court held
that the refusal of the network, an FCC licensee that accepted
paid commercial advertising, to run a paid political advertise-
ment did not violate first amendment rights. In Miami Herald v.
Tornillo,106 the Court declared unconstitutional a state right-to-
reply statute that required newspapers to give space to political
candidates whom it had criticized personally. Hudgens, deny-
ing the right of access to a public forum and repudiating Logan
102. See, e.g., Chicago Joint Bd. Amal. Cloth. Workers v. Chicago
Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973
(1971); Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100
(D. Colo. 1971). See also Lange, supra note 98, at 25-26.
103. See Business Exec. Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d
642 (1971), rev'd sub noa. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973); Johnson & Westen, supra note 56, at 597.
104. In Business Exec. Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642(D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom. CBS v. Democratic NaVl Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973), the court of appeals held that the relationship between
the FCC and the networks was sufficient to find that the networks'
actions were to be reviewed under constitutional standards. In Resident
Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 1971),
and Chicago Joint Bd. Amal. Cloth. Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435
F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971), the courts
found the analogies to Marsh and Logan Valley untenable, holding that
newspapers are not open to the public and furthermore that control of
a method of reaching an audience did not transmute a private corpora-
tion into a government entity.
105. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
106. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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Valley, represents the last step in the rejection of the affirmative
view of the first amendment. In one sense, Hudgens is a more
sweeping denial of access than either the television or newspaper
cases. In CBS, the Court concluded that because the network,
under the "fairness doctrine,"'' 7 already had an obligation to
present all sides of controversial issues, there was no infringe-
ment of the Committee's freedom of speech in the FCC's
failure to order networks to accept paid political ads in addition
to their own coverage. In Miami Herald, the Court viewed the
reply statute as a vehicle for the state's telling a newspaper what
to print, thus infringing the rights of the independent press
explicitly protected by the first amendment. 0 8
In contrast to these preferred rights under the first amend-
ment, in Hudgens, only the less-preferred right of property"
weighed against the picketers' right of free speech. Moreover,
members of the Court have noted on other occasions that for
an ordinary citizen without financial backing the handbill, pam-
phlet, or street corner speech are the only available means of
reaching an audience. 10 Although public -parks, sidewalks, and
streets are still open to the exercise of first amendment rights, in
many parts of the country the shopping mall is the real center of
the community."' Hudgens, therefore, takes away, except at
107. See Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
108. There has been considerable debate among commentators as to
whether the separately specified freedom of the press in the first amend-
ment calls for different approaches in matters touching freedom of the
press than in matters concerning other forms of speech. Compare Nim-
mer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does
it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HAsTiNGS L.J. 639 (1975) and Stewart,
"Or of the Press," 26 HASTiNGS L.J. 631 (1975) with Lange, The Speech
and Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 77 (1975). This distinction, how-
ever, whether or not accepted, is not central to the analysis in this Arti-
cie, except to the extent that it 1may provide an independent basis
for some of the recent cases rejecting the concept of a right of access
to means of communication.
109. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). In the court's
analysis of Hudgens, only property rights of the owner were at issue.
A fuller analysis, however, would have recognized that the owner's rights
involved more than just physical power, and that the allocation of use
of property by the owner could have been an exercise of speech-related
interests. See text accompanying notes 60-72 supra.
110. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972) (Marshall,
J.; dissenting); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J., dis-
senting).
111. In Logan Valley, for example, the majority cited statistics indi-
eating that the population shift from cities to suburbs has been accom-
panied by growth in the number of shopping centers and their proportion
of retail sales. 391 U.S. at 324 (1968).
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the grace of the mall owner, the forum through which a less
affluent speaker could reach the largest audience. From the
speaker's point of view, Hudgens undermines freedom of speech
and the ideal of a marketplace of ideas, since, quite literally, no
ideas or information not approved by the property owner are
allowed to enter the marketplace. Nevertheless, from the point
of view of the property owner-and the community-such re-
strictions are necessary to preserve the vitality of the free speech
guarantee.
The ideal of the first amendment is that prohibiting govern-
mental suppression of speech will result in vigorous public debate
and an informed citizenry weighing the merits of competing
viewpoints. The Constitution does not, however, mandate that
everyone participate in this process,112 nor does it require private
property owners to subordinate personal or economic interests
to the service of the ideal.1" 3 Moreover, the first amendment
as we know it could not permit government-directed right of ac-
cess, whether to television, newspapers, or physical locations for
speech and speech-related activity. As the Court noted in CBS,
enforcement of such a right with regard to broadcasting or news-
papers would require government involvement in day-to-day edi-
torial and managerial decisions."14 If the goal of access is presen-
tation of diverse and contradictory views, the government,
through courts or agencies, would have to ensure that the presen-
tation of ideas and information was "balanced" fairly. 1 5 The
112. One justification for free speech, is, of course, the benefit
which the public at large derives from hearing a diversity of
viewpoints and ideas. But if the sole or even the paramount
aim of the first amendment is merely to ensure that the public
is able to hear a Babel of voices, the first amendment is not the
great libertarian principle it has been thought to be. Freedom
of speech is a justifiable aim in itself insofar as it helps to create
the individual freedom and security essential to a free society.
It need not be buttressed by any apologies that it will assure
the dissemination of a diversity of viewpoints, that it will en-
sure a free marketplace for ideas, or that it is a surer means
of advancing truth.
Robinson, supra note 100, at 159-60.
113. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
114. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1972).
115. See Lange, supra note 98, at 75. Professor Lange also argues
that an attempt to achieve "balanced" presentation of views would in-
evitably conflict with the principle that the most appealing ideas prevail
in the marketplace and thereby "suppress" those less appealing.
Johnson and Westen propose a kind of "common carrier" access-
first-come-first-served. Johnson & Westen, supra note 56, at 627-29.
Such an approach may provide for more voices, although not necessarily
for diverse voices. Moreover, if such a policy created high demand for
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Court rejected the access theory because the hoped-for gains
could not outweigh the damage to first amendment values that
such government interference would bring.11"6
Administration of a right of access to private property such
as a shopping center, designed as a marketplace for goods and
services, not ideas, would create similar difficulties. How could
a court, for example, determine if a fair sampling of community
opinion were offered within the limits of available time and
space? More important, how could a court make such a deter-
mination without considering the content of speech, an inquiry
heretofore forbidden by the first amendment?1 17 Alternatively,
if the property owners were required to allow balanced use of
the forum if any use were allowed, the result would probably
be closing the facilities to all groups and a loss to the community.
Every reasonably imaginable consequence indicates that the sac-
rifice of owners' speech and property rights would mean little
enhancement of the rights of nonowners, and little benefit to
the community. In expressly overruling Logan Valley, Hudgens
removed the last theoretical support for an access theory and
affirmed the Court's view that the continued vitality of the free
speech guarantee requires a strict reading of state action in first
amendment cases to preserve a wide sphere of private choice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Hudgens is a regrettable decision both because of the
Court's reasoning and its failure to explicate the full extent of
the state action requirement in cases determining rights of free
speech. A fuller exploration of the principles involved in the
decision of a private person to choose among various sources of
ideas and information or to exclude speech-related activity from
private property entirely demonstrates that the right to choose,
although not absolute, 1 8 is best served in constitutional adjudi-
cation by a strict reading of the state action requirement of the
fourteenth amendment and by rejection of the notion that under-
mining the speech and property rights of private persons serves
the community interest in free speech and exchange of ideas.
access, the price of time could be bid up until only affluent groups could
purchase it. See Lange, supra note 98, at 76.
116. 412 U.S. at 127; id. at 161 (Douglas, J., concurring). See also
Jaffe, supra note 100, at 782-87.
117. See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Police Dep't
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
118. As illustrated by the Court's deference to the NLRB for decision
on nonconstitutional grounds. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
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